This paper evaluates the effects of restricted land use rights on aggregate productivity using microlevel data within a quantitative model. In particular, I exploit the Rice Land Designation Policy in Vietnam, which forces farmers to produce rice on almost 45% of land plots. I use digitized versions of Vietnam's Local Land Use Atlas and Global Agro-Ecological Zones database to construct a micro-spatial dataset that shapes the model features and allows me to compare the restricted against a counterfactual efficient allocation. The main findings suggest that eliminating all land use restrictions leads to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita. While misallocation in agriculture has been studied extensively, the paper highlights a novel source of misallocation also prevalent in other countries such as China, Myanmar, and Uzbekistan.
Introduction
There is a strong consensus in prior studies that the lack of secure rights to land is a constraint to efficient resource allocation, thus lowering agricultural productivity. 1 However, much of the focus has been placed on land transfer rights (sell, rent, bequeath, mortgage), and little attention has been given to land use rights. Focusing on the latter under-explored area, this paper presents the effects of restricted land use rights on productivity and resource allocation.
To do so, I exploit a particular type of land use restrictions, the Rice Land Designation Policy in Vietnam (RLDP) 2 , as a natural setting for quantitative analysis.
Starting around 1986, Vietnam began to shift from a centrally planned to a market economy with a series of market-oriented reforms. In agriculture, privatizing production and granting land rights have created a significant incentive for farmers to allocate their resources more efficiently, leading to as much as 50% of TFP gain during the 1990s (World Bank, 1998 ). Nevertheless, Vietnamese farmers are still subject to remnants from past institutional arrangements. A notable case is the existence of RLDP, a centralized land use planning system forcing farmers to grow rice on their lands. This policy plays a significant role in supporting the National Food Security program, the objective of which is to achieve national food self-sufficiency. In 2011, the Vietnamese government established a target of 3.8 million hectares, i.e. 39% of the total agricultural land, to be devoted to rice production by 2020 (Resolution 17/2011/QH13). 3 This paper explores the extent to which the practice of RLDP to stimulate rice production can generate distortions in both land use and labor allocation, thus lowering productivity at the aggregate level. To quantify the distortionary effects of RLDP, I develop a two-sector model comprising three final goods. Two of the three final goods are produced in the agricultural sector, namely rice and non-rice crops (other agricultural commodities). The third final good is produced in the non-agricultural sector by a representative firm. Individuals with heterogeneous ability can be farmers or workers. In agriculture, the production unit is a farm. Each farmer maximizes profit by choosing which crop to produce and how much quality-adjusted land to rent. With reference to RLDP, a fraction of agricultural land is restricted to rice production only. Land characteristics (e.g. quality and restriction status) are taken as given. In non-agriculture, the representative firm requires only effective labor as an input.
To quantify the effects of the restrictions, I exploit both household-level surveys (Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey) and spatial datasets (Local Land Use Atlas and Global Agro-Ecological Zones) to account for heterogeneity in labor and land characteristics. The primary results concern the effects of entirely removing RLDP on aggregate productivity and resource reallocation. To do so, I compare the current economy of Vietnam to a hypothetical economy where RLDP does not exist.
My approach to quantifying the misallocation effects of RLDP builds upon the recent macro-development literature that studies the impacts of micro-level distortions on aggregate outcomes. However, the paper differs from others in two main aspects. First, I consider a specific type of distortionary policy (land use restrictions) in a particular context (Vietnam) . Second, the model incorporates the spatial characteristics of land, which is essential to agricultural production. The main findings suggest that eliminating all restrictions coming from RLDP leads to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita, a 40.68% gain in agricultural labor productivity, a rise of 37.89% in agricultural TFP, a 5.89% reduction in agricultural employment, and a 6.26% increase in average farm size.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of related literature and background information on RLDP. Section 3 outlines the model used in the quantitative analysis. Section 4 defines the equilibrium and discusses mechanisms of resource reallocation.
Section 5 connects the model and data. Section 6 presents the main results along with a series of robustness checks and extensions. Then, Section 7 concludes the study. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to exploit micro-level data in quantifying the aggregate effects of this type of institution which involves "forced" production. The main strands of literature that the paper is related to are as follows.
The first and broader strand of literature attempts to explain productivity losses in agriculture through the lens of resources misallocation caused by specific policies. 4 For example, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a) show that the Philippines 1988 land reform imposing a ceiling on land holdings lowers farm size by 34% and agricultural productivity by 17%. Studying the case of China, Adamopoulos et al. (2017) document that Chinese land institutions can account for approximately 46% of agricultural productivity loss. Chen (2017) finds that land titling can raise agricultural productivity by up to 82.5%, with 42% coming from land reallocation and the remaining stemming from efficient-occupational choice. Gottlieb and Grobovsek (2019) report that removing the communal land tenure system lowers agricultural employment by 19% and increases aggregate output by 7%. In this paper, I employ micro-data This particular relaxation raises production of the other crops by about 3.8%, which in turn leads to a gain of $52 million in welfare. Giesecke et al. (2013) apply another computable general equilibrium model (MONASH) to perform their analysis across industries. Their simulated results suggest that removing RLDP can increase real GDP and consumption per annum between 2011 and 2030 by 0.27% and 0.39% respectively. The analyses in both papers are conducted at the industry level, and the gains are driven by differences in land rental rates between rice and non-rice industries. Put it differently, their gains come from reducing the cross-industry dispersion in the marginal product of land by switching a fraction of homogeneous land from rice to non-rice production. Consequently, these studies do not account for heterogeneity at the lower levels of aggregation (i.e. individuals and land plots). The growing literature on misallocation shows that much of the losses in productivity is actually due to distortions across individual producers (see, for example, the seminal works of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) ). Therefore, my study offers a distinct but complementary explanation of the effects of RLDP by accounting for heterogeneities at the lowest level of aggregation. In particular, my model allows for the productivity heterogeneity of farmers, spatial distribution of land suitability, spatial distribution of RLDP restrictions, and their interrelationship. 5 
Major Reforms in Vietnam's Agricultural Land Policy
Vietnam's era of central planning is generally regarded to have ended in 1986 as the state started to introduce a series of market-oriented agricultural and industrial reforms. In agriculture, a critical reform was the enactment of the Directive No.10 in 1988, which abolished collective farming and recognized the household as an autonomous unit in the economy. With the issuance of the Directive, parcels of agricultural land were allocated to families along with certificates of land use rights (CLUR) for 10-15 years. 6 For the first time, farmers were granted the right to make their own decisions related to the sale of outputs, or the purchases and uses of inputs; thus offering a significant incentive for agricultural production.
A drawback of Directive No.10 was that households could not trade their land use rights.
A subsequent agricultural reform, the Law on Land 1993, granted farmers five fundamental land rights. These rights comprise transfer, exchange, lease, inheritance, and mortgage rights.
Since then, the process of land allocation has been steadily proceeding, along with several adjustments to the Law on Land in 1998 Land in , 2001 Land in , 2003 Land in and 2008 to encourage the development of land markets. However, the allocated lands remain the state's property and must be returned to the state when farmers stop using them. Technically, farmers are only able to 5 In addition, the paper can be linked to studies that provide microeconomic evidence on the effects of RLDP and land rights in Vietnam. For example, Markussen et al. (2011) find that RLDP restrictions do not affect household income due to the compensation by the local authorities, but farmers tend to switch to other crops when restrictions are lifted. Do and Iyer (2008) show that progress in land titling raises the production of multiyear crops and household labor supply in nonfarm work. Menon et al. (2017) document that land use rights held exclusively by women or jointly by couples result in lower household vulnerability to poverty and increased household expenditures as well as women's self-employment. 6 A CLUR can be thought of as a license that permits a recipient to use his/her allocated plot of land. Detail information of the assigned plot is printed on the CLUR issued to its operator including plot code, address, size, blueprint, acquirement source, expiration date, land use purpose, and personal information of the operator. The section of land use purpose in CLUR, in which crop choice restrictions are clearly stated (if any), is the focus of this paper.
transfer, exchange, lease, bequeath, or mortgage the right to use the land (for a limited time), not the land itself.
The reforms in Vietnam's land policy were partially motivated by years of struggling with food security. Before the reforms, the country experienced severe food shortages, and domestic subsistence consumption mostly relied on the former USSR's food aid. By 1988, malnutrition became a widespread phenomenon, 3 million people faced starvation, 12 million people were short of food, and million tons of rice had to be imported to fight hunger. Since the issuance of Directive No.10 and Law on Land 1993, privatizing production and granting land rights have created a significant incentive for farmers to allocate labor and land more efficiently, leading to as much as 50% of TFP gain during the peak of the reform period. Such remarkable improvement is underlined by the successful transformation from a rice-importer to become the second-largest rice-exporter in 1997 (for an in-depth review, see World Bank, 1998).
Land Use Restrictions and RLDP in Vietnam
Although the series of extensive reforms has remarkably changed the landscape of Vietnam's agriculture, the state has continued to direct policies towards securing food supply rather than improving the rural living standard. One of the most prevalent practices is to constrain farmers' right to choose which crop to cultivate. A dominant type of this land use restriction is RLDP, the subject of this research which requires farmers to grow rice on their land. The objective of producing enough rice to ensure national food sources has been widely stated and repeated. 7
It is crucial to understand how RLDP is crafted. First, the restriction quota (e.g., 3.8 million hectares by 2020) is established through the 10-year land use plan by the central government.
After the aggregate target is set, following a top-down approach, the Ministry of Natural 
Land Use Restrictions in Other Countries
Other countries also have such rules in place in varying degrees of intensity. Beyond Vietnam, a significant portion of farmers is also coerced into growing rice in Myanmar. According to Chapter X of the country's Farmland Law 2012, farmers are prohibited from growing alternative crops without the permission of the government. Exploiting within-village variations in an empirical study, Kurosaki (2008) finds that being restricted to growing rice is associated with a decrease of 8.3% in crop income of Burmese farmers. China has a system called "zeren tian" (responsibility land), in which parcels of agricultural land are allocated to households on the basis of household size and ability to engage in agriculture.
However, farmers need to deliver a mandatory quota of grain at a below-market price to the authorities in exchange for use rights. Responsibility land accounts for 70% of total farmland in 2008 (Gao et al., 2017) . In several Central Asian countries, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the state still owns the land and severely restricts many farmers to growing cotton through production quotas. The combination of low incomes and the compulsion to produce cotton in these Central Asian countries leads to many social issues, including widespread child labor and forced labor (ILO, 2015) . In Appendix C, I document several nationwide policies in developing countries that directly place restrictions on land use. Policy titles, brief descriptions, and effective dates are included. While not mentioned, regional policies and those that indirectly affect land use (e.g. crop-specific seeds and fertilizer subsidies) can also alter crop choices. 9 3 Model I consider a static economy in which three final goods are produced, namely rice, non-rice (all other crops), and a non-agricultural product. The first two are produced in the agricultural sector by heterogeneous farms, and the third good is produced in the non-agricultural sector by a representative firm. In the model, individuals with heterogeneous ability can choose to work as farmers in the agricultural sector or wage workers in the non-agricultural sector.
In agriculture, farmers require land to produce. However, a fraction of land is subject to RLDP, i.e. reserved for rice production only. Consequently, RLDP creates resource misallocation through two channels. First, it prevents restricted land from being optimally used, decreasing land productivity. Second, it distorts the allocation of labor by reducing the number of workers and increasing the number of farmers.
Two essential features of the model are built on previous studies. First, in the spirit of 
Besides, the indicator δ j takes a value of one if parcel j is subject to RLDP (i.e. reserved for rice production), and zero otherwise.
Farmers can rent a fraction of a parcel, multiple parcels, or any combination to produce either rice or other crops to maximize their profits. As shown later in this section, the optimal crop choice on a parcel is jointly determined by its two-dimensional suitability and common crop prices. 11 However, RLDP-restrictions prevent the optimal allocation, giving rise to both land and labor misallocation.
Technology and Production
Agriculture Sector -The production unit in agriculture is a farmer that needs to incorporate her ability to decide how many effective units of land to rent and which crop to cultivate.
Here, I assume that each farmer produces only one crop and may use both restricted and unrestricted land to do so. Let us consider a farmer i endowed with ability z i . If the farmer chooses to produce rice, she rents e Ri effective units of land. Her real output in producing rice (y R ) is given by,
11 Land suitability and land productivity are used interchangeably in the paper because the former term is widely adopted in prior studies.
Analogously, if the farmer decides to produce other crops, she rents e Oi effective units of land. 12 Her real output in producing other crops (y O ) can be expressed as follows,
where the relative importance of land in production α ∈ (0, 1) governs the production functions in producing both rice and other crops. The constant term κ −1 = α α (1 − α) 1−α is here to simplify expressions later on. Note that I do not impose any limitation on the relationship between {e Ri , e Oi } and {E Rj , E Oj }. Thus, farmers are allowed to rent a fraction of a parcel, multiple parcels, or any possible combination to meet their demand.
In the model, RLDP restrictions happen at the parcel-level, not farm-level (further discussion is provided in Section 3.4). Here, farmers solve the usual profit maximization problem. I let {q R , q O } depict the unit costs of an effective unit of land in producing rice and other crops respectively. Farmer i's profit maximization problem in producing rice is given by,
with {p R , p O } are the prices of rice and non-rice crops. First order conditions imply,
Similarly, if she chooses to produce other crops, her profit is given by,
Non-Agriculture Sector -Since the focus is the agricultural sector, I keep production in the non-agriculture simple. The output is produced by a representative firm with access to constant returns to scale technology. To produce, this firm requires only effective labor as an input. The production function takes the following form,
where Y M is the total amount of non-agricultural output produced and N M is the set of workers (the set of farmers is then N A ). The representative firm maximizes profit by deciding 
Labor Allocation
I now discuss the allocation of labor across sectors. The individuals choose between one of the two mutually exclusive jobs: farmer and non-agricultural worker. In addition, if an individual decides to become a farmer, she can further choose to produce either rice or other crops. Her optimal occupational choice is the most profitable one derived from the following
• Proposition 1 There exists a threshold, denoted byτ , such that individual i becomes a farmer if τ i ≥τ , and a worker otherwise. Conditional on being a farmer, the individual
The proof of Proposition 1 comes from the indifference conditions between the choices of occupation and production. Let us first consider the problem of choosing which crop to produce by farmer i. From equations (4) and (5), it can be shown that the profit difference across crop production choices for any farmer depends only on the output prices and rental rates of effective units of land. In particular,
Here, farmer i will produce rice if π R (z i ) − π O (z i ) ≥ 0, and other crops otherwise. It is clear that the production choice is independent of individual endowment {z i , τ i }. If the inequality
all farmers would engage in the production of other crops. I then place a plausible restriction on the utility function so that the indifference curve for consumption goods does not cross the consumption axes (the assumed function is shown in Section 3.5).
This way, corner solutions will not be possible, and the case where
This profit indifference condition also suggests a common price ratio λ ≡ q R /p
O across farms and crops.
Next, an individual i with a set {z i , τ i } maximizes her earnings by choosing to be a nonagricultural worker for an amount of w(z i , τ i ) or a farmer for a profit of π(z i ). The optimal occupational choice can be described by the indifference condition between earnings across the two occupations. Equalizing w(z i , τ i ) and π(z i ) yields the thresholdτ , such that,
Intuitively, the idiosyncratic distortion τ i can be thought of as any type of barriers to labor mobility across sectors. For example, the set of farmers i ∈ N A includes those who face a high enough migration cost, i.e. τ i ≥τ , so that they decide to stay in agriculture. Analogously, the set of workers i ∈ N M are those enjoying lower cost of mobility, i.e. τ i <τ , thus moving to the non-agricultural sector. Utilizing the common price ratio λ = q R /p
solutions to farm profit maximization as in equation (3), I can express the optimizing rules for farmer i as follows,
These equations suggest that farm profit (9), value-added (10), and input expenditure (11) are equal across crop choices for each farmer. With α and λ being common across farms, equation (10) states that variation in farm value-added linearly depends on variation in individual ability. This characterization provides a simple mapping between the model distribution of farmer's ability and the empirical distribution of farm's value-added in the calibration.
Restrictions and Land Allocation
In this section, I turn to discuss land use allocation. As discussed in Section 3.1, agricultural land comprises a set of parcels, such that the total agricultural area is the sum of all parcel areas L = j∈J l j dj. The variable δ is an indicator, with the convention that δ j = 1 if parcel j is subject to RLDP. Therefore, the total restricted area in agriculture can be expressed as j∈J δ j l j dj, and the total unrestricted land is given by j∈J (1 − δ j )l j dj.
In the absence of land use restrictions, all farmers maximize their profits, implying that parcels of land are optimally utilized. This means the land supplier (representative household) rents out the parcels at their highest values, and the land renters (farmers) will put them to their best use. Consider parcel j ∈ J with a suitability set {s R , s O }, the value of this parcel is given by q R E Rj = q R l j s Rj if it is used in rice production. Similarly, if parcel j is utilized for non-rice production, its value is q O E Oj = q O l j s Oj . Then, the optimal value of parcel j follows a rule given by,
where I make use of the equality λ = q R /p
to derive the right-hand side of equation (12) . However, due to RLDP restrictions, the parcels with δ = 1 can only be used in rice production. Consequently, the values of these parcels are distorted.
For example, if parcel j ∈ J is reserved for rice production, i.e. δ j = 1, then its value is simply fixed at [q R l j s Rj ]. Put it differently, there are no other choices regarding land use for the parcels subject to RLDP.
Equation (12) states that the optimal use of a parcel is determined by the relative suitabilities and crop prices. For example, if (s Rj /s Oj ) α > p O /p R , then it is efficient to devote parcel j for rice production, and vice versa. Let D be a dummy variable indicating the optimal use of all parcels, with the convention that D = 1 if it is optimal for a parcel to produce rice. The optimizing rule for land use in equation (12) can also be described by,
With this way of denotation, I can express the total land rent, which is aggregated from equation (12), in a more compact form. Particularly, the total land rent in rice production, denoted by Q R , is given by,
and in the production of other crops, denoted by Q O , is as the following,
In equation (14), the first and second integral terms are the total effective units of land used in rice production for the restricted and unrestricted areas respectively. Analogously, the value of the integral in equation (15) represents the total effective units of land utilized for the production of other crops, conditional on not being restricted.
Consumption
The representative household uses all of its income to purchase consumption goods. The total income can stem from three main sources: (i) individual income from workers and farmers 
The household seeks to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint
It has preferences over the consumption of agricultural and non-agricultural goods described by the following utility function,
where {C R , C O } denote the total consumption of each agricultural good, and C M is the total consumption of the non-agricultural good. The parameters {φ, β} ∈ (0, 1) govern the preference weights across consumption goods, and ζ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across crops. Finally, the parameter ψ depicts the subsistence requirement for agricultural goods in the spirit of . Thus, the household always prioritizes the consumption of agricultural goods up to ψ level. After that, it may allocate the remaining income to all goods according to their weights. The first order conditions gives us the standard results,
Intuitively, the right hand equality of equation (17) states that the household always devotes χ(p R , p O ) amount of its income to agricultural goods to survive. After meeting the subsistence requirement, it can freely allocate the remaining income to non-agricultural goods p M C M and non-subsistent agricultural goods • Given prices, the thresholdτ is the optimal occupational choice for all individuals, and D j ∀j ∈ J is the optimal use for all unrestricted parcels.
• Given prices, the allocation rules e g (z), y g (z) g∈{R,O} are profit-maximizing for all individuals choosing to be farmers.
• Given prices, the bundle {C R , C O , C M } is utility-maximizing for the representative household, subject to the budget constraints.
• Representative non-agricultural firm optimizes, budget balances, and all markets clear, 1. Output markets from equation (6, 10) and budget balance,
2. Land market from equation (11, 14, 15) and the household's land income,
Misallocation
The following discussion describes the effects of RLDP on productivity through two channels, namely land use misallocation and distortions in occupational choice. To do so, the current economy of Vietnam is compared to a hypothetical economy where all restrictions are removed.
To keep the discussion intuitive and straightforward, I provide examples in which I abstract from the offsetting effects caused by changes in prices.
• Proposition 2 Removing RLDP raises the aggregate agricultural output and agricultural TFP by increasing the average effective stock of agricultural land.
The intuition is quite simple. Removing restrictions means that the entire agricultural land can be put to their best use. As a result, the effective stock of agricultural land is maximized, leading to an increase in the agricultural total factor productivity. For quantitative reasoning,
and by T F P A the agricultural total factor productivity. Then, I formalize an equation that allows me to quantify the value of T F P A . First, from equation (10), the total agricultural output Y A can be derived as follows,
wherez A is the average farmer ability, andz A N A is the total stock of farmer ability. Analogously, I denote byĒ = (Q R + Q O ) λL the average effective stock of land (please refer to equations (14) and (15) for full expressions). Then, the land market's clearing condition from equation (19) can be rewritten as the following,
Combining equations (20) and (21), the aggregate agricultural output can be expressed as a function of total agricultural land (L), the total number of farmers (N A ), and agricultural TFP, given by,
where the term T F P A representing the agricultural TFP will be my primary focus when performing the quantitative analysis. In addition, the functional form of T F P A states that any improvement in the average effective stock of land (Ē) or farmer ability (z A ) will raise the agricultural TFP.
For the purpose of simplicity, let us consider a simple case where all prices and labor allocation are held fixed. I denote byĒ * the average effective stock of land at the efficient level. From the discussion in Section 3.4, the total gain in the average effective stock of land stemming from RLDP relaxation is given by,
Here, the effective units of land are weighted by the corresponding constant prices. The dummy δ indicates the restriction status of the parcels of agricultural land. Similar to equation (12), the maximization term here regulates the optimal land use for all of the parcels (∀j ∈ J). First, equation (23) states that not all restricted areas are distorted in land use. For example, if parcel j's optimal choice is to produce rice, i.e. max p
RLDP does not change its optimal use. Thus, there is no gain in the effective stock of land as the term in the square bracket of equation (23) takes a value of zero. However, if the optimal choice of parcel j is to produce other crops, i.e. max p
then RLDP prevents the parcel from being optimally utilized. It is clear that the loss in the effective stock of land is captured by the difference term l j p
Therefore, in this simple case, the gains in the agricultural TFP and aggregate output from eliminating RLDP is induced by an increase in the average effective stock of land, given by,
The equation also suggests that the gain in productivity is sensitive to the parameter value α. To avoid overestimating the productivity gain, I take a conservative approach by choosing a low value of α in calibration. Note that there are price effects offsetting the gain from resource reallocation. The reason is that inputs (labor and land) and output (rice and others)
are not perfect substitutes. These price effects manifest themselves through both crop choice and occupational choice. In the example given above, I abstract from the price effects for the sake of simplicity. However, I do allow prices to change in my actual analysis.
In the next stage, I turn to discuss the changes that occur to occupational choices. As the agricultural sector becomes more productive due to RLDP relaxation, there will be a reallocation of labor across sectors. This movement has non-negligible impacts on both agricultural and non-agricultural productivity.
• Proposition 3 Relaxing RLDP releases farmers from agriculture, thus raising the total output in the non-agricultural sector.
The intuition is as follows. First, the supply of effective stocks of land is distorted by RDLP.
Consequently, the agricultural TFP and the total agricultural output in the restricted economy are both lower than those at the efficient level. Since the representative household must secure the subsistence consumption, it has to allocate a significant share of its members into agriculture to compensate for the loss in the total agricultural output stemming from land use misallocation. 13 From Proposition 2, liberating RLDP will raise the agricultural output by improvement in T F P A , thus reducing the burden of subsistence consumption requirement.
It follows that a number of farmers will be released to the non-agricultural sector as RLDP restrictions being lifted.
To facilitate the discussion, let us relax the assumption of fixed labor allocation in the example given in Proposition 2. The output and input prices are still being held constant, i.e. abstracting from the offsetting price effects. I proceed to write the right-hand equality of equation (17) as
Then, the non-agricultural output gain can be expressed as follows,
where Y * M is the non-agricultural output at the efficient level. Equation (25) states two important points. First, as the total agricultural output increases (Y * A > Y A ), the total non-agricultural output must also increase (Y * M > Y M ). Second, the higher the level of subsistence consumption requirement, the larger the effect of misallocation. In other words, the term [Y A − χ] < Y A captures the amplified output gain/loss in the non-agricultural sector caused by misallocation in the agricultural sector. For example, the smaller the value of
From equation (6)
is driven by additional workers moving to the non-agricultural sector, not the other way around. Therefore, my model suggests that the gain/loss in agricultural productivity also reflects the increase/decrease in the supply of workers in the non-agricultural sector.
Next, I denote by N S andz S the total number and the average ability of those switching occupation after moving to the efficient level. As the assumption of fixed labor allocation is relaxed, the gain in agricultural output derived from equation (22) is given by, (26), I decompose the gain in agricultural TFP as follows,
This equation states that the change in agricultural TFP is driven by changes in both labor and land allocations. As discussed in Proposition 2, lifting RLDP leads to an increase in the average effective stock of land, thus contributing to the gain in agricultural TFP.
This gain can be reduced or amplified depending on the relationship betweenz A andz S .
For example, ifz A <z S , the reallocation of labor out of agriculture will offset the gain in agricultural TFP coming from land reallocation. Analogously, from equation (27), the change in non-agricultural labor productivity is given by,
Here, labor productivity in non-agriculture is obtained by dividing output by the total number of workers. Since the representative firm requires only effective labor to produce, non-agricultural labor productivity is also non-agricultural TFP. From equation (29) , it is clear that the change in non-agricultural labor productivity is also influenced by the average ability of those moving out of agriculture. For example, ifz S <z M , non-agricultural labor productivity will decrease, and vice versa.
With reasonable parameter values in line with the calibration (labor productivity in nonagriculture is much higher than in agriculture), the mobility cost τ is negatively correlated with individual ability z. I denote byτ * an efficient threshold characterizing occupational choice. From the discussion of equation (8), it follows that individuals with τ i ≥τ * will remain in agriculture. Since liberating RLDP will reduce the number of farmers, the inequalitȳ τ * >τ must be satisfied. Therefore, the average ability of those moving out of agriculture (those endowed withτ * > τ i >τ ) will be lower than the average ability of the existing workers, but higher than that of the remaining farmers, i.e.z A <z S <z M . This movement implies a reduction in the average ability of both farmers and workers. As a result, equation (28) suggests that the reduction in average farmer ability will offset the gain in agricultural TFP stemming from the improvement of effective stock of land. From equation (29) 
Individual and Land Characteristics
Individual Characteristics -I first take the log of both sides of the equation (10) to undo the multiplication as follows,
where the term py( 
where ǫ i is a random variable drawn from a normal distribution with a variance of σ 2 ǫ . The parameter γ 0 serves as a scale. The two parameters γ 1 and σ ǫ together govern the distribution of ability. In particular, the parameter σ ǫ is used to reproduce the empirical variation of farm value-added. The value of γ 1 regulates the correlation between ability and distortions, allowing me to reproduce the sectoral difference in labor productivity. A negative value of γ 1 implies a negative correlation between ability z and distortion τ . Consequently, low ability individuals tend to face high mobility barrier, creating an incentive for them to stay in agriculture. This characterization allows me to precisely match the large gap in labor productivity across the two sectors. In Appendix D, I provide a more detailed discussion of the relationship between γ 1 and τ . I then digitize the maps using ArcGIS. 16 On the maps, RLDP and non-RLDP areas are 14 In computation, I also trim 0.1% tails of the distribution for consistency. 15 It is worth noting that the National Assembly 2011 established RLDP restriction quotas for each province in the next ten years based on the detail information of LLUA.
color differentiated, allowing me to separate them computationally. As a result, I obtain full information on which area is for agriculture production (both RLDP and non-RLDP areas) and which agricultural area is subject to RLDP.
The constructed shapefile is graphically presented in Figure 1 . The spatial distribution of Vietnam's agricultural land is displayed in Figure 1a . Then, I divide agricultural land into yellow and blue areas, as shown in Figure 1b . Farmlands that fall in the yellow region is reserved for rice production only. The remaining located in the blue region is where farmers can cultivate other types of crops. As reported in Resolution 29/2004/QH11, the share of the restricted area is around 45%, which is close to the value of 46% in my constructed dataset.
Hence, the digitized atlas and the actual estimate are quite similar. From the GAEZ database, I acquire potential yields for wetland rice and other 17 major crops for each cell. 18 Combining with the spatial distribution of agricultural land (see Figure 1 ), I obtain full information on potential yields across 18 crops on the agricultural land of Vietnam.
I further report the spatial distributions of the potential yields across parcels of agricultural land in Figure A1 in the Appendix. For illustrative purposes, the yields on agricultural land in Figure A1 are divided into 4 quantiles, ranging from light-green to dark-green. In the combined dataset, the smallest spatial unit is a GAEZ's grid cell intersecting (overlapping) with an LLUA's polygon, corresponding to a parcel in the model. 19 Figure 2 shows how the process of intersection is done. In Figure 2a , the yellow and blue polygons represent restricted and unrestricted land respectively. The gray fishnet is the GAEZ's grid cells carrying potential yields of the 18 crops. As shown in Figure 2b , the fishnet is intersected with the polygons to form smaller polygons referred to as parcels. Note that the white area is non-agricultural land that is not relevant to the analysis. As a result, I obtain the potential revenue for rice ( p R y Rj ) and non-rice ( p O y Oj ) for all parcels.
Unlike the actual yields that rely on the skills of the farmers, the potential yields are not constrained by farmers' ability. In other words, farmers' ability is assumed to be high enough so that they can achieve the potential yields on their land. GAEZ considers this level of ability to be common, so that crop yields are defined consistently across all cells and crops. I refer to this level of ability as potential ability, denoted by z p . Then, the potential revenues of parcel j ∈ J for growing rice or non-rice can be expressed as the following,
These equalities imply that the relative potential revenues between any two parcels {j, k} for each crop is governed only by crop-specific productivities and parcel sizes. In particular,
This characterization allows a simple mapping between productivities and potential revenues. While spatial information is at the parcel-level, it is not necessary that farmers would need to rent the whole parcel for production. The model allows for many farms located within a parcel or many parcels located within a farm. What matters to farmers is the effective unit of land (size×crop-specific productivities). For a given ability, a farmer can either have a large farm with low land quality or a small farm with high land quality. Her total land rental cost and value-added are the same regardless of the option she chooses. By doing so, the model is flexible in allowing for different combinations of farms' sizes and shapes, as long as the total agricultural area is fixed and land characteristics follow GAEZ and LLUA's empirical distributions. However, in exchange for such flexibility, the model must rely on the assumption that there is no spatial connection between farmer and land characteristics. In other words, the model assumes that the distributions of individual and land characteristics are independent. This assumption is quite plausible because the study makes use of GAEZ's potential yields, which depend on purely exogenous agro-climatic conditions. 
Calibration Choices

Full Relaxation and Main Results
The baseline experiment concerns the effects of entirely liberating RLDP. To do so, I set δ j = 0 ∀j ∈ J, then re-solve the model with the calibrated set of parameters. I first pay particular attention to the impact that RLDP generates on land and labor allocation. Then, I focus on a number of key aggregate observations such as labor productivity, real output, and GDP per capita.
Land and Labor Allocation -The first channel, which is discussed in Proposition 2, is land use reallocation. Fully removing RLDP means that the entire agricultural land can be put to their best use. Figure 4a illustrates the spatial allocation of land use in the restricted economy. The green area where rice is being grown covers approximately 54% of agricultural land, 46% and 8% of which are RLDP-restricted and unrestricted respectively. Non-rice crops are cultivated on the remaining land (purple area) consisting of around 46% of agricultural land. In addition, 11.55% of the land is utilized for rice production voluntarily. This means 8.3% of RLDP land (3.55% of total land) is not binding, and farmers still choose to produce rice in the absence of RLDP on this area (see the discussion of equation (23)). The spatial reallocation of land use in the efficient economy is presented in Figure 4b . The figure states two important points. First, under full relaxation, agricultural land is optimally utilized, with 16% of the land being reallocated to the production of the other crops. As a result, the rice area reduces to 38% while the non-rice area increases to 62% of agricultural land. Second, in the central and southern part, most of the rice land in the restricted economy is converted to non-rice land after RLDP being lifted. In contrast, fewer non-rice and more rice crops are grown in the northeastern part at the efficient level. In total, 33% of agricultural land is converted from rice to non-rice production, and 17% of agricultural land is turned from non-rice into rice cultivation. The reason is that the non-rice price (with respect to rice price) decreases from 2.69 to 1.84. Thus, it becomes more profitable to convert from non-rice to rice production in some areas (mostly in the northeastern region) since the relative suitability between non-rice and rice is not high enough (see equation (13) for the optimizing rule of crop choice). Relevant statistics of land allocation are provided in Table 2A .
Next, I focus on the impacts of liberating RLDP on individual choices of occupation. Figure   5a depicts cumulative agricultural employment as a function of individual ability (log). Here, the restricted economy (solid red line) induces a larger share of agricultural employment compared to the unrestricted economy (dashed blue line). The reason is that the agricultural productivity in the restricted economy is lower than that of the efficient level. Consequently, a larger share of labor must be devoted to agriculture to ensure enough agricultural output for subsistence consumption. The movement of labor out of agriculture as RLDP being lifted has two important implications for labor productivity. First, a reduction in the total number of farmers raises the ratio of land to farmer. In particular, approximately 3% of the working population moves to the non-agricultural sector as RLDP is liberated. Since the total agricultural area is fixed, this switch leads to an increase in the average farm size of 6.26% accordingly. Second, the average ability of those moving out of agriculture is lower than the average ability of the existing workers but higher than that of the remaining farmers (see Proposition 4). This movement induces a reduction in the average farmer and worker ability by 1.46% and 3.34% respectively.
For illustration, Figure 5b shows the relationship between the labor movement and sectoral average ability. Here, job switching rate refers to the share of the working population moving from agricultural to non-agricultural sector. The average ability ratio is the ratio of sectoral averages to their benchmark values. The figure shows gradual declines in farmer average ability (solid red line) and worker average ability (dashed blue line) as the process of labor reallocation occurs. Table 2B summarizes the relevant statistics of the labor allocation discussed above. In addition, I model farmers to be indifferent in crop choice leading to indeterminacy in labor allocation of rice and non-rice activity. What matters is the share of the total stock of farmer ability ( i∈N A z i di) devoted to each crop production, which is regulated by the distribution of land characteristics. Therefore, I only report results for labor allocation between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Table 3 . It is important to note that all outputs in Table 3 are defined in terms of real GDP. All of the values are in constant 2000 US dollars, i.e. evaluated at the benchmark prices. The nominal GDP can be computed using the new set of prices, which can be important in welfare analysis. However, the focus of the paper is misallocation and productivity. Therefore, the nominal GDP is not relevant.
In the first row of Panel A in Table 3 , I report the agricultural total factor productivity T F P A .
I find that eliminating RLDP raises agricultural TFP by 37.89%. As discussed previously, the two channels of resource reallocation leading to the gain in productivity are land and labor allocation. Land allocation alone contributes to the gain in TFP by 1.4-fold. This gain, however, is offset by a factor of 0.98 from the reduction of the average farmer ability (see equation (22)). Another important concern is farmer average productivity Y A /N A . As shown in the second row of Panel A, farmer productivity experiences an increase of 40.68% from $668 per farmer to $939 per farmer. To understand this gain, I decompose farmer productivity into the following based on equation (22),
From this decomposition, the increase of 40.68% in farmer productivity is due to the increases in agricultural TFP and average farm size by 37.89% and 6.26% respectively. Here, the change in average farm size is due to the reallocation of around 3% working population from agriculture to non-agriculture, raising the ratio of land to farmer. The gains in agricultural TFP and farm size together constitute the total gain in average farmer productivity through a multiplicative effect. 22 Reported in the third row of Panel A, labor productivity in the non-agricultural sector decreases by 3.34%. From the discussion of Proposition 4, the reason is that the average ability of those moving out of agriculture is lower than the average ability of the existing workers. These individuals increase the number of workers by 5.83% while driving down the average ability by 3.34%, thus reducing the non-agricultural labor productivity by an equal amount. Economy-wide labor productivity is also of interest. As shown in the last row of Panel A, I find that eliminating RLDP raises economy-wide labor productivity by 8.03%.
This improvement results from the increase in agricultural labor productivity combined with the offsetting effect from the reduction of non-agricultural labor productivity.
It is also of interest to look at the real outputs. Lifting RLDP reduces the total amount of rice dramatically by 44.71% while increasing the output of other crops and non-agricultural goods by 50.92% and 2.30% respectively. I cautiously note that the gain in productivity costs a non-negligible loss in the total rice output. Since the novelty of RLDP is to ensure national food sources, it is important to assess the matter of self-sufficiency in rice production.
According to the FAOSTAT database, total rice consumption is 0.44 the total amount produced as of 2013. In the analysis, the level of rice produced at the efficient level is 0.55 the benchmark amount (35.58/64.36), which is still well above the current level of consumption of 0.44. Moreover, there is a declining trend in rice consumption over the year because of the increases in per capita income. For example, using household-level surveys, World Bank (2016) estimates that household rice expenditure decreased by more than 30% from 2002 to 2012. Therefore, these observations together call for the need for removing RLDP.
Overall, my baseline results suggest that eliminating RLDP leads to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita. This improvement is indicated by a 40.68% gain in agricultural labor productivity, a rise of 37.89% in agricultural TFP, a 5.89% reduction in agricultural employment, and a 6.26% increase in average farm size. An important question to ask is whether these values together make sense. In a model calibrated to the U.S, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014b) document that reducing economy-wide productivity to the poor economy-level increases the share of agricultural employment from 2.5% to 16.6%, decreases average farm size by 8.6-fold, depresses agricultural labor productivity by 11.2-fold, and generates a 7.6-fold reduction in aggregate labor productivity. Compared to their results, mine are much smaller in magnitude because I focus exclusively on a particular case of resource misallocation. However, the pattern is the same regarding the channels through which agricultural misallocation manifests itself.
Policy Options
The next experiment explores several policy options that Vietnam could employ to achieve the same targets as in the restricted economy. To do so, I classify policy options into three types, including: (i) price support to artificially increase the price of rice, (ii) relative suitability Rice Price Support - Table 4 compares key statistics generated by RLDP and suggested targeting policies. Column 1 reports the results for the benchmark economy, which are similar to those of Table 2 
I then set the value of η to 0.91 and 0.41 such that the total share of rice land is 0.539 and the real quantity of rice per capita is 64.36 as in the benchmark economy respectively. I find that output-targeting price support is a better alternative underlined by an increase in GDP per capita from $1,745 to $1,859, a difference of $102 compared to land targeting.
Relative Suitability Designation -The next set of policies focuses on redesigning RLDP. I first abstract from the current RLDP. Then, I place restrictions on parcels of land based on their rice to non-rice suitability ratios. To do so, I create a threshold such that parcels are restricted to rice production if their suitability ratios are higher than this threshold. The threshold is chosen so that the economy can achieve the benchmark level of rice land or output. It takes a value of 1.64 and 1.02 to match the total share of rice land of 0.539 and rice per capita of 64.36 respectively. Overall, I find that land targeting RLDP redesignation is a better option as GDP per capita increases to $1,838.
Overall, this exercise provides more productive alternatives to RLDP while still achieving common goals. To attain the benchmark's share of rice land, Vietnam should employ the relative suitability designation (Panel A, Column 3). However, if the target is the benchmark level of rice per capita, rice price support should be employed (Panel B, Column 2).
Sensitivity Analysis
Fixed Prices -An important concern is that Vietnam is not a big country nor is it closed.
Therefore, the price of goods might not be very sensitive to RLDP relaxation. To this end, I explore the impacts of RLDP with output prices being fixed instead of considering a closed economy. Row 2 of Table 5 provides key statistics from this sensitivity check including: (i) the gain in agricultural productivity ∆T F P A , (ii) the gain in GDP per capita ∆GDP , and productivity (40.97%) is higher than those in the previous exercises. However, without the reallocation of labor to the more productive non-agriculture sector, the gain in GDP (7.79%) is lower than the baseline level (8.03%), even after ruling out the offsetting effects. In either case, the results with or without the offsetting effects (price and selection) are not much different from each other. the values of these parameters by around ±20% and recalibrating the economy to the same targets as before. Row 5 to 10 report the results from these robustness checks.
As shown in the discussion of equation (24), the misallocation effects of RLDP is larger as land becomes more important, and vice versa. Thus far, I have chosen the land elasticity value of α = 0.33. Now, I change the value of α to 0.26 and 0.40. Indeed, the results are quite sensitive to these changes. Reducing the value of α by 20% leads to changes in reported statistics by around 23% on average. For example, the gain in agricultural TFP reduces to 28.43% when α = 0.26, and increases to 48.20% when α = 0.40. Since I set a conservative value of α, it is unlikely that the misallocation effects are overestimated in the baseline results.
In the benchmark economy, the value of β = 0.11 is calibrated to the subsistence income level marked by the Vietnamese government. Here, I want to examine how the gains respond as β is moved to 0.09 or raised to 0.13. Note that a lower value of β means a higher level of subsistence requirement, thus, suggesting a more responsive employment share (see equation (25) and its associated discussion). Consistent with the prediction, I find that the misallocation effects on ∆T F P A and ∆GDP are slightly enlarged as I move β to 0.09, and slightly reduced as β = 0.13. However, these fluctuations are insignificant in magnitude compared to the impacts on ∆F armer. Previous studies have assumed a value of β that is closer or equal to zero, such as the works of Gollin et al. (2002 Gollin et al. ( , 2007 and . Therefore, the baseline gains can be considered as conservative.
For the elasticity of substitution across agricultural goods, I have set ζ = 2.63 as a midpoint between the values documented in prior studies. Here, I allow ζ to take a value of 2.1 and 3.1 for the sensitivity checks. This range of value is much broader than the range suggested by previous studies. However, I prefer a more extensive range because the preference for rice is declining rapidly, e.g. a reduction of 32% in rice share of household food expenditure over the period of 2002 -2012 (World Bank 2016). In either case, I still observe substantial misallocation effects that are not much different from the baseline results.
Conclusion
This paper examines the impacts of Vietnam's Rice Land Designation Policy on resource allocation and productivity using micro-geographical data and household surveys over the period of 2004 -2014. In the theoretical framework, the restrictions on farmland not only lower agricultural productivity but also prevent a share of labor from moving out of agriculture.
The main counterfactual experiment suggests that eliminating all land use restrictions leads to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita. This improvement is indicated by a 40.68% gain in agricultural labor productivity, a rise of 37.89% in agricultural TFP, a 5.89% reduction in agricultural employment, and a 6.26% increase in average farm size. The sensitivity analysis shows that the main results are unlikely to be inflated by the choices of parameter values.
While misallocation in agriculture has been studied extensively, the paper highlights a novel source of misallocation prevalent in other countries such as China, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, among others. Nevertheless, I cautiously note that the gain in productivity costs a nonnegligible loss in the total rice output. The novelty of RLDP is to ensure national food security to cope with unexpected circumstances. Indeed, rice has been the primary subsidy for people living below the national poverty line and those experiencing natural disasters.
Therefore, making appropriate adjustments regarding RLDP may require both economic and political assessments. The sets of maximization problems in (B1) and (B2) yield the same set of solutions, given by,
In the main model, both crop choice and occupational choice are governed by the relative price p R /p O (see Section 3.3 and 3.4). The relative price between rice and non-rice crop is given by,
where Ω is the value inside the square brackets. Land Use Zoning Land will be categorized on the basis of geographical structure, nature, and its capacity. The land classified for one purpose will be prohibited to use for another purpose (the lowest level of purpose is crop-by-season).
[Status: Effective from 2020 expectedly]
Nigeria Nigerian Sugar Master Plan
An additional 250,000 ha is reserved for sugarcane production to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar. 
Zimbabwe
Command Agriculture A contract farming system aimed at ensuring food self-sufficiency by contracting farmers to produce the specified crops. A land area of 290,000 and 50,000 ha is targeted for maize and rice production respectively.
[Status: Effective since 2016 ] two types: (i) a random distortion due to τ with γ 1 = 0, and (ii) correlated distortion due to the combination of τ with γ 1 = 0. To explore the relative magnitude of these two channels, I set γ 1 = 0, resolve the model, and compare relevant statistics with the benchmark economy (where γ 1 = −0.63).
The results of this exercise are reported in Table D1 . Without the selection effect, individuals randomly allocated to the two sectors. Consequently, farmer productivity increases by 89.97% and worker productivity decreases by 33.78%. Overall, GDP per capita is higher in the benchmark economy under the presence of correlated distortion. Intuitively, the economy should perform better when high-ability individuals face fewer distortions (mobility barrier to non-agriculture in this case). Regarding how the two parameters are identified, I assume a uniform distribution in the range of [0, 1] for τ (with τ max = 1), then set γ 1 = −0.63 to match the sectoral productivity gap. The distribution and the range of τ are chosen arbitrarily here (similar to Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014)). The relationship between γ 1 and the range of τ is illustrated in Figure D1 . The smaller the range of τ , the higher the absolute value of γ 1 required to match the sectoral productivity gap. The baseline results remain unchanged regardless of different combinations of {τ max , γ 1 }.
Instead of assuming a joint cdf H(z, τ ), there are different approaches taken by prior studies. For example, I can have just one common fixed cost of mobility, such as the work of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a). However, doing so will change the shape of individual ability distribution when requiring the model to reproduce the distribution of individual earnings. The ability distribution would be discontinuous at the threshold of occupational choice, with the lowest ability of nonagricultural workers being higher than the highest ability of farmers. Another approach is to have a joint distribution of agricultural and non-agricultural ability as implemented in Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Adamopoulos et al. (2017) . This approach will require two more moments for the model to match relevant targets (the sectoral earnings correlation and the dispersion in non-agricultural earnings). Since my focus is land use misallocation in agriculture and the transition of labor out of agriculture, I shy away from the second method to avoid unnecessary complications. Therefore, as in Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014), I prefer the use of the idiosyncratic distortion for two reasons: (i) it provides a straightforward setup in this context, and (ii) it allows for an extra degree of freedom in reproducing individual earnings, thus keeping the ability distribution from being compromised. Figure D1 : The relationship between γ 1 and τ max
